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What can welfare states tell us about social deservingness and the logics of 
poorness and poverty? The work presented in this book suggests that the 
answer is, quite a lot. Therefore, the concept of a welfare state and of how 
states that claim to be welfare states are constituted and actualised is of 
fundamental concern here. The key concept that is threaded throughout this 
book is the idea of social deservingness, namely, ideas about what people 
deserve to get and what they should have to do in order to get it. I relate this 
to welfare states by suggesting that how we ‘do’ collective welfare, that is, 
how a given society constitutes its specific welfare state apparatus, can and 
does tell us something about how that society views matters of social 
deservingness. The welfare state is suggested to provide a ‘temperature 
reading’ for how societies ‘feel’ about who deserves to get what. It is not a 
wholly accurate reading as many of the ideas and concepts that give the 
measure are continually being contested. Yet it is presented here as being 
reasonably approximate on the basis that it is likely to have been historically 
mediated. Throughout the text, this is a broadly theorised proposition and 
not meant to relate to any one welfare state in particular—although, where 
examples are drawn upon, they are primarily based in Europe and in what 
might be considered Western Europe, most notably in Britain and Ireland 
as part of the Global North. It follows then that neither is this book 
concerned with specific cohorts of welfare recipients or with specific 
regimes or schemes. Rather, the concern here is with the collective poor and 
impoverished both historically and in a contemporary sense. It should be 
noted that as someone who has lived with and experienced poorness and 
poverty, I use the term ‘poor’ here unapologetically and I don’t intend to 
dilute it by saying anything else; poor means poor and using any other word 
is really only offering ‘poor’ comfort to people other than the poor themselves.  
Having suggested that welfare states can tell us something about ideas of 
social deservingness, I stretch this proposition further by purposing that 
particular logics of poorness and poverty became more pronounced when 
wedded to the capitalist mode of production. I do this in the course of tracing 
the history of social deservingness and arrive at this specific juncture at the 
point of the Protestant Reformation. I show how this logic of poorness was 




states today. In doing so, I pay attention to where alternative views of social 
deservingness have been put forward by radical voices also.  
On the whole, this is necessarily a selective exercise and, in many ways, 
gives but a flavour of a broader and developing thesis. Because it is a 
selective and developing thesis, many worthy areas of scholarship are not 
drawn upon. For example, there is a rich historical feminist literature that is 
not extensively consulted here. Indeed, in a discussion on welfare and on 
social deservingness it is hard not to see Mary Astell (1668-1731), or Mary 
Wollstonecraft (1759-97) as glaring omissions. It is my hope that any person 
reading this book whose interest has been sufficiently piqued, may seek out 
such authors to facilitate a broader personal understanding.  
Looking at social deservingness in this way is also an attempt to unravel the 
political economy of deservingness. This is because when we pose social 
deservingness as a question it ultimately becomes a question of the 
distribution of resources. Who should get what and what they should have 
to do in order to get it are questions reflected in a welfare state, which, 
through the plain fact that they are not immune from and indeed are 
undoubtedly susceptible to politics and public opinion, also reflect our 
broader ideas about deservingness, generosity, reciprocity and so on.  
Welfare states might also be said to represent a compromise between capital 
and labour, with the welfare state acting as an acknowledgement of the risks 
involved in selling one’s labour. This has also been a historically mediated 
process. For example, legal recognition in Britain that work conditions, if 
not maintained to a certain acceptable standard, could cause illness, injury, 
and death, began with the birth of the Factory Inspector under the Health 
and Morals of Apprentices Act of 1802, introduced by Sir Robert Peel in 
the British Parliament and commonly known as the ‘Factories Act’. It would 
not be until the Workman’s Compensation Act of 1897 that a formal 
recognition of the need for income maintenance in the face of an injury or 
illness sustained at work would be legislated for in what then constituted 
Britain, which included, via colonial status, the ‘Kingdom’ of Ireland. Let 
us say that these changes indicated two things. Firstly, a growing awareness 
that workers perhaps ‘deserve’ decent working conditions, and secondly 
that workers injured through work potentially deserve compensation while 
unable to work. These legislative events represent changes to the social 
contract under a burgeoning capitalist mode of production. Clearly then, 
there are risks associated with the capitalist mode of production, and these 
changes arguably reflect those risks. But there is still a contradiction here 
which suggests something else must mediate what happens in welfare states, 
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something beyond a social response to risks involved in selling one’s labour. 
It is not, for example, as easy a task to explain the many other factors of 
collective welfare such as the care and maintenance of the elderly through 
things like state or occupational pensions in the same terms. Ostensibly, 
there is no benefit to the capitalist in maintaining persons who have moved 
beyond prime working age. Likewise, collective welfare measures 
surrounding areas like disability or lone parenthood are harder to explain in 
these terms purely. Why then do welfare states generally make provision for 
these groups? Arguably, this is because, alongside a compromise between 
labour and capital, the care and maintenance of groups such as those 
mentioned reflect ideas around social deservingness which are in turn 
reflected in a welfare state.  
Generally speaking, there is a feeling that the older persons who have moved 
beyond work and into retirement, deserve to be supported. People who are 
unable to work through injury, illness or disease deserve to be supported. 
People who are parenting alone deserve to be supported. People with 
physical and intellectual disabilities and who cannot work deserve to be 
supported. The idea of a welfare state has expanded over time to something 
beyond the need to maintain labour, to something which acts as recognition 
of and a defence against the harsher realities of the human life-course. The 
levels of support for particular groups are, of course, prone to fluctuate, with 
some groups generally coming in for more censure than others. Nevertheless, 
modern welfare states arguably reflect, in the main, our notions of what 
people deserve to get and who those people should be.  
Collectively then, the welfare states of post-war Europe arguably represent 
some of the greatest social and political achievements that humanity has 
made since divesting itself of the state of nature and organising under a form 
of social contract. The fact that these achievements in greatness came on the 
back of a period that illustrated the worst that humanity is capable of is also 
arguably telling. When William Beveridge called in 1942 for “revolutions, 
not for patching”, the world was shrouded in an existential darkness which 
has hardly been seen since.  
Yet, as I have been writing this book, humanity has been in the grip of 
another existential crisis in the form of the threat posed by Cov-Sars2-
COVID-19. Naturally, this was not something I had envisioned encountering 
when I first proposed writing this book. Yet, neither is it something that I 
would now want to ignore. This is because, in many fundamental ways, the 
crisis posed by COVID-19 has placed the issues at the heart of this book, 




in respect to public and social policy. Therefore, in the epilogue, I address 
the question of what the future of welfare might be. Here it was my original 
intention to address how we might begin to change how we think about 
social deservingness through things like universal basic income (UBI), and 
a changing relationship to work. As it happens, I do not intend to stray too 
far from this task, however, what is written now must be read through the 
lens of a post-COVID future, whatever that might be.  
Finally, and before beginning, I want to address briefly the style of this 
book. It should therefore be noted that this book is written in the spirit of a 
polemic. There will be no ambiguity here and while the scholarship herein 
is hopefully robust, the author is very much on the side of collective welfare. 
Therefore, this book represents a contribution to the broader critique of 
capitalism and of how welfare is organised under the capitalist mode of 
production. As well as being a scholarly work, this study has also sought to 
be informative and entertaining, challenging dominant societal narratives 
while hopefully illustrating alternatives. The chapters are designed as a set 
of discreet yet interlocking scholarly essays. It is hoped, therefore, that the 
book can be read in whole or in part with little difficulty and that while there 
is a common thread running through it the reader can dip and in and out as 
needed. Furthermore, I have tried, as much as possible, to use freely 
available sources when writing so that the reader, should they wish to do so, 
can access the texts upon which I draw. Thankfully, I have managed this in 
respect to many of the historical sources in particular.  
 
